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INTRODUCTION

This Article offers a critical reassessment of U.S. approaches
to intellectual property protection for plant innovation. Three
developments make this reassessment timely.
First, the Supreme Court has finally confirmed that utility
patent claims to plants and seeds satisfy the 35 U.S.C. § 101
subject matter eligibility requirement.! Plant innovation in the
United States is now subject to utility patent protection, as well
as concurrent protection under the Plant Variety Protection Act
(PVPA).' This development might presage a significant
realignment in the seed industry's intellectual property portfolio
strategy, as seed industry lawyers rethink the desirability of
maintaining both PVPA protection and utility patent protection
for proprietary varieties. However, little work has been done to
explain the role of PVPA protection in a system of concurrent
protection, or to develop a coherent policy vision within which the
utility patent and PVP systems might operate.

1. This Article is one in a series of studies on optimizing intellectual property
regimes for plant innovation. This research is being conducted under the auspices of the
Intellectual Property & Plant Innovation (IPPI) Project. The IPPI Project is supported by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture through the Illinois-Missouri Biotechnology Alliance
(IMBA) Program and the University of Iowa Faculty Scholar Program.
2. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001).
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000). Plant innovation may be protectable under a
variety of other arrangements as well, including the plant patent statute, 35 U.S.C. §§
161-164, state trade secret law, contracts (via the use of"seedwrap" license agreements),
and, in some instances, biological limitations such as hybridization. For an overview, see
Jay P. Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection and Agricultural Biotechnology-A
MultidisciplinaryPerspective, 44 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 464, 486-87 (2000).
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Second, technological advancements, particularly in plant
biotechnology, are making clear the value of germplasm. U.S.
patent and PVPA regimes must be optimized to encourage
private sector investment in germplasm development while
retaining reasonable access to germplasm to accommodate
farming practices and public sector activities.4
Third, intellectual property protection for plant innovation is
a key international intellectual property issue. The TRIPS
Agreement' expressly allows World Trade Organization (WTO)
countries the option of adopting sui generis plant variety
protection systems as an alternative to-or in combination
with-utility patent protection for plant innovation.6
This Article focuses on one facet of the reassessment project:
the role of plant variety protection in the U.S. intellectual
property system. 7 In J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
International,Inc., the Supreme Court characterized the PVPA
as providing "limited patent-like protection for certain sexually
reproduced plants,"8 echoing earlier statements in which the
Court described the PVPA as supplying "patent-like protection to
novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants (that is, plants
grown from seed) which parallels the protection afforded
asexually reproduced plant varieties (that is, varieties

4.
Research expenditures in the agricultural sector are not trivial. The Economic
Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that private sector
investments in overall agricultural research amounted to some $4 billion for 1996, with
an additional $3.1 million of public sector funds expended that same year. See Ann M.
'
Thayer, Owning Agbiotech, 79 CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS, Sept. 17, 2001, at 25, 28.
The three major seed industry companies (Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta,
respectively) all have multi-billion-dollar operations. Id. at 26 (reporting that Monsanto's
seed unit had sales of $935 million in the first half of 2001; Pioneer Hi-Bred (DuPont) had
first quarter 2001 sales of $929 million; and Syngenta had first half 2001 Sales of $407
million).
In addition, because the seed industry constitutes the first link in a tightly
interlocked agricultural supply chain, decisions about intellectual property incentives for
the seed industry are certain to have economic implications for all participants in the
supply chain: distributors of agricultural commodities, the food industry, the farming
community, and others.
5.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
6.
Id. art. 27(3)(b).
7.
In other works, we focus on the role of the utility patent system and on the
broader question of dealing with interfaces between intellectual property regimes. See
Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, Weed-Free IP.: The Supreme Court, Intellectual Property
Interfaces, and the Problem of Plants (forthcoming) (on file with the Authors); Mark D.
Janis, Sustainable Agriculture, Patent Rights, and Plant Innovation, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEG. STUD. 91 (2001) [hereinafter Janis, SustainableAgriculture].
8.
J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer High-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 138
(2001).
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reproduced by propagation or grafting) under [the plant patent
provisions]. " ' One of our tasks in this study is to demonstrate
that these characterizations of the PVPA as "patent-like" are
largely inapt.
We first assess U.S. plant variety protection from an
historical and comparative perspective, analyzing the emergence
of the concept of "breeders' rights" in Europe and its eventual
appearance in the United States. We then delineate the
"essential traits" of the modern PVPA and note its points of
divergence from a patent-like model. We next turn to an analysis
of the modern PVPA from an empirical perspective, in which we
present the results of statistical PVP data and anecdotal studies
of PVPA acquisition, licensing, and enforcement activity for corn
and soybean crops. We conclude that experience with the PVPA
does not support the claim that it provides patent-like incentives
for plant innovation and that the PVPA serves primarily as a
vehicle by which to satisfy international obligations.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF SuI GENERIS SYSTEMS
FOR PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION

The problem of providing adequate ex ante incentives for
innovations in plant breeding has vexed the intellectual property
community for at least a hundred years. On the one hand, the
case can be made that the need ,for intellectual property
protection is especially acute for plant innovation. Plant
innovation is borne in seeds, and, at least in the case of selfpollinating plants (such as soybeans), seeds make hundreds of
copies of themselves in the natural growth process. From the
standpoint of a producer of innovation, the notion of a selfreplicating invention presents as compelling a case for
intellectual property intervention as can be imagined. °
On the other hand, policymakers have long perceived a lack
of fit between plant innovation and traditional intellectual
property regimes. Thus, the history of intellectual property

9. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995).
It is as if Columbia Pictures, having invested over $130 million to produce the
10.
movie "Spider-Man," suddenly discovered that each "Spider-Man" DVD spontaneously
produced a hundred near-identical copies of itself after a few weeks under proper care.
Compared to this, Internet proliferation of unauthorized copies might appear positively
benign. See, e.g., Andrew Buncombe, "Spiderman"Swings its Way to Box Office Record,
INDEP. (London) May 6, 2002, at 4 (reporting the $130 million figure); Kevin Featherly,
"Spider-Man" Creeps Around Web, But Obi-Wan's MIA, at http://www.washington
post.com/ac2/wp-dyn//A52086-2002May21.html (last visited July 12, 2002) (reporting that
"Spider-Man," released to U.S. theatres on May 3, 2002, was appearing in unauthorized
incarnations on the Internet by May 12, 2002).
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protection for plant innovation is characterized by a variety of
efforts to fit plant innovation into traditional regimestrademark/unfair competition regimes as well as patent
regimes-followed by a gradual shift towards sui generis "plant
variety" regimes. The sui generis regimes can best be analyzed
against this mosaic of predecessor trademark and patent
proposals.
A. Trademark/ Unfair CompetitionApproach
One might approach the problem of providing incentives for
plant breeding as one of product differentiation. That is, one
might conclude that the source of the problem is the inability of
growers to distinguish one plant breeder's products from
competitors' products-or, more precisely, one plant breeder's
seeds from those of competitors. The competitors might then be
able to free-ride on the goodwill that the plant breeder has built
up in popular varieties. If this is a correct characterization of the
problem, then the solution might appear to be straightforward
under modern intellectual property law: extend trademark
protection to seed brands.
One of the earliest U.S. intellectual property measures
devoted specifically to plants took a trademark approach. The
legislative proposal, introduced by Representative Allen in
1906," would have afforded to "any person who has discovered,
originated, or introduced any new variety of plant,... and gives
and applies thereto a name," 2 the opportunity to register the
name, thereby securing for a ,twenty-year term "the exclusive
right to propagate for sale and vend such variety of horticultural
product under the name so registered."'3
As legislative debate quickly revealed, the proposal was
flawed on several levels. First, it was ill-timed; by 1906, the
United States had little experience with successful trademark
legislation at the federal level.'4 Second, the comments of one of
11.
A Bill to Amend the Laws of the United States Relating to the Registration of
Trademarks, H.R. 13570, 59th Cong. (1906), quoted in Arguments Before the House
Comm. on Patents on H.R. 13570, Authorizing the Registration of the Names of
Horticultural Products and to Protect the Same, 59th Cong. 3-19 (1906) [hereinafter
Argument on H.R. 13570].
12.
H.R. 13570 § 28a, quoted in Argument on H.R. 13570, supra note 11, at 3.
13.
H.R. 13570 § 28b, quoted in Argument on H.R. 13570, supra note 11, at 5.
Anticipating future debates over the clash between intellectual property rights and
farming practices, the legislation specifically limited the exclusive grant of rights,
specifying that "the flowers, fruits, or food products produced from such registered variety
may be sold by any person whatsoever for any purpose other than that of propagation."
Id.
14.
The Supreme Court had struck down the federal trademark statute on
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the bill's proponents reflected a theme that has continued in U.S.
plant intellectual property to the present day-a fundamental
mismatch between aspirations and legislative implementation.
Whereas the legislation provided only trademark protection, its
sponsor attributed to it a patent-like goal: to "encourage [U.S.
citizens] in the propagation of new varieties."" The legislative
record reflects confusion over whether the legislation would
afford patent-like protection, 6 leaving legislators ultimately to
observe that the proposal "seems to be more under the patent law
than under the trade-mark law."'"
Third, it is not clear that the characterization of the problem
as one of product differentiation is quite accurate. The problem,
then and now, extends beyond the erosion of the breeder's
incentive to invest in building up reputational value, to the
erosion of the breeder's very incentive to invest in innovation.
Even under the modern Lanham Act regime, it is not clear that
trademark and unfair competition law could adequately secure
the plant breeder's business
18 goodwill, much less encourage
innovation in plant breeding.
The United States was not alone in experimenting with a
trademark/unfair competition solution to the problem of
adequate breeders' incentives. France, the Netherlands, and
constitutional grounds in the Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1879). A new federal
trademark regime had just been introduced in 1905. See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK
D. JANIS, TRADEMARK & UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW & POLICY ch. 1 (forthcoming) (on file
with the Authors). Much of the brief debate over H.R. 13570 concerned its
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. Argument on H.R. 13570, supra note 11, at
4-7.
15.
Argument on H.R. 13570, supra note 11, at 6.
16.
Representative Bonynge asked whether "the main purpose of this bill" was "to
give a monopoly for twenty years to the man who originates the plant," and Chairman
Currier responded that the legislation gave plant breeders a "monopoly to produce and
sell under a name which they give to the plants." Id. at 7. Bonynge disagreed, asserting
that the legislation gave producers "a monopoly to sell that particular variety under any
name, no matter what name," and Representative Kirk, one of the bill's proponents,
corrected him, explaining that the "monopoly" was limited to "the name registered." Id.
17.
Id. (remarks of Representatives Hinshaw and Bonynge).
18. The breeder in a modern trademark/unfair competition action would
presumably be asserting Lanham Act violations for the unauthorized multiplication of the
genuine product and sale of that product either (1) under the originator's name, albeit not
through authorized channels, or (2) under the competitor's name. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114
(2000). Neither situation lends itself to straightforward trademark analysis. The former
situation might be somewhat analogous to the problem of gray market goods, while the
latter might be treated as a matter of "reverse passing off' under modern trademark
doctrine. See Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988) (defining "gray-market
good" as "a foreign-manufactured good, bearing a valid United States trademark, that is
imported without the consent of the United States trademark holder"); Web Printing
Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1203 n.1 (7th Cir. 1990) (defining "reverse
passing off' as a situation in which "a person removes or obliterates the original
trademark, without authorization, before reselling goods produced by someone else").
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Germany all experimented with systems that combined
concepts of seed registration (apparently to allow government
control of trade) and trademark protection.19 It is not evident
that any of these systems contributed materially to
incentivizing innovation in plant breeding.
B. PatentApproach
Within weeks after the failed effort to use the U.S.
trademark system to create an incentive structure for plant
breeders, Representative Allen tried again, this time
introducing a bill to amend the utility patent statute to
accommodate plant innovation."0 To the then-existing utility
patent eligibility provision, R.S. § 4886, the bill would have
added a new section, § 4886a, providing that:
Any person who has discovered or originated any new
horticultural variety of plant, tree, or vine, not known or
propagated by others in this country before his discovery
or origination thereof, and not patented or described in
any printed publication in this or any foreign country
before his discovery or origination thereof, or more than
ten years prior to his application, and which has not been
on sale in this country for more than two years prior to
his application, may ... obtain a patent therefor. '
The bill would also have added a new provision specifying the
requisites of application for plant-related patents, calling for
"a written description setting forth the name of plant ... to
which such new variety belongs,... and a full, clear, and'exact
description of the characteristics of such new variety as will
enable any person learned in the science of horticulture to

19.
See, e.g., Andre Heitz, The History of the UPOV Convention and the
Rationale for Plant Breeders' Rights, in 1991 SEMINAR ON THE NATURE AND
RATIONALE FOR THE PROTECTION OF PLANT VARIETIES UNDER THE UPOV CONVENTION

25-26 (UPOV 1994) [hereinafter Heitz, History of the UPOV].
20.
A Bill to Amend the Laws of the United States Relating to Patents in the
Interest of the Originators of Horticultural Products, H.R. 18851, 59th Cong. (1906),
quoted in Arguments Before, the House Comm. on Patents on H.R. 18851, To Amend
the Laws of the United States Relating to Patents in the Interest of the Originatorsof
Horticultural Products, 59th Cong. 3-18 (1906) [hereinafter Argument on H.R.
18851]. Previous legislative proposals for patents on plants had been advanced. See,
e.g., H.R. 5435, 52d Cong., 23 CONG. REC. 892 (1892) (extending patent protection to
"any new and useful plant, fruit, or flower" that met standard utility patent
protectability requirements).
21.
H.R. 18851 § 4886a, 59th Cong. (1906), quoted in Argument on H.R. 18851,
supra note 20, at 15.
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identify such new variety and distinguish the same from other
varieties."2
Albert H. Walker, practitioner and treatise-writer of Walker
on Patents fame,2" appeared in support of the proposed
legislation; his testimony neatly anticipated two of the principal
issues that have been debated over the course of the twentieth
century and into the twenty-first on the idea of patents for
plants.24 First, Walker addressed the "natural products" objection
to patenting living subject matter.25 Clearly, Walker thought
little of the objection, maintaining that there was a definite
distinction between ineligible "discoveries" (such as the discovery
of the anesthetic qualities of ether) and eligible "inventions," and
arguing that a plant "created by" a breeder and "never existing
before" fell within the latter category.26
Second, Walker spotted a key issue relating to the character
of the disclosure. He noted that the enablement requirement in
the proposal only called for enough disclosure to enable a skilled
artisan to "identify" the new variety and distinguish it from
others, whereas the standard patent law enablement
requirement applied in this setting presumably would "enable
anybody else to produce that new variety in the same way in
which it was produced" by the patentee.27 Walker was obviously
troubled by the implications of extending patent law description
requirements to living subject matter, and he wanted more time
to considerthe matter.28
The proposal failed, as did a number of others in the early
1900s.2" Indeed, Congress never adopted explicit legislation
implementing fully the patent approach to the problem of
incentives for plant breeding. ° Instead, in the Townsend-Purnell
22.
H.R. 18851 § 4888a, quoted in Argument on H.R. 18851, supra note 20, at 15.
23.
See Argument on H.R. 18851, supra note 20, at 13 (referring to Walker as "a
distinguished patent lawyer and author").
24.
See Argument on H.R. 18851, supra note 20, at 12-18. The document reports
hearings that were held on May 9, 1906, and May 17, 1906. Walker appeared during the
May 9 hearings and submitted a letter in connection with the May 17 hearings. Id. at 3,
12-13.
25.
Id. at 16.
26. Id. However, Walker did recommend that the distinction could be reinforced in
the legislation by eliminating references to "discovery" and substituting "invention." Id. at
17. Walker also thought it important that the bill be limited so that it would not cover
"the case where the patentee had merely gone into the woods and found a weed that
nobody had seen before." Id.
27. Id.
28.
Id. (twice indicating that he wanted "to reflect a little" longer).
29. See Heitz, History of the UPOV, supra note 19, at 20 (referring to unsuccessful
U.S. legislative proposals in 1907, 1908, and 1910).
30.
Nor did Congress ever expressly exclude the possibility of applying the existing
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Plant Patent Act of 1930, 31 Congress created a plant patent
regime limited to varieties that had been asexually reproduced.32
The House Report accompanying the plant patent legislation
acknowledged that the asexual reproduction requirement
"greatly narrows the scope of the bill."33 The bill proposed "to give
the necessary incentive to preserve new varieties" by
encouraging breeders to multiply asexually the new and valuable
varieties that they discovered, but the bill did not "give any
patent protection to the right of propagation of the new variety
by seed, irrespective of the degree to which the seedlings come
true to type."34 In subsequent judicial interpretation, the Federal
Circuit has placed great weight on the limiting effect of the
asexual reproduction requirement, explaining that (1) the
requirement "is the cornerstone of plant patent protection,"35 (2)
it follows that the term "variety" as used in the Plant Patent Act
must be understood to encompass a single, individual plant, 36 and
(3) infringement of a plant patent is essentially of the narrowest
type conceivable in intellectual property, in that infringement of

utility patent eligibility provisions to living subject matter, including plants. The Supreme
Court, of course, ultimately interpreted those provisions to cover biological subject matter.
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
encompass living subject matter generally); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 101 to encompass seed-grown
plants specifically).
Now codified, as amended, at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2000).
31.
In addition to introducing the asexual propagation requirement, the Plant
32.
Patent Act made other doctrinal innovations. For example, perhaps recognizing Walker's
unease over the issue of adequate descriptions for living subject matter, the Act required
merely that the disclosure be "as complete as is reasonably possible." See 35 U.S.C. § 162.
33.
H.R. REP. No. 1129, at 4 (accompanying H.R. 11372, 71st Cong. (1930)).
34.
Id. at 5. Congress was persuaded that human effort to undertake asexual
propagation of new plant varieties deserved encouragement. See id. Valuable new
varieties such as the McIntosh apple "could not have been reproduced true to the type by
nature through seedlings," but rather required human intervention in the form of asexual
propagation. Id. at 4-5.
Congress did express a classic patent-like aspiration for the plant patent
legislation in its hope "that the bill will afford a sound basis for investing capital in plant
breeding and consequently stimulate plant development through private funds." Id. at 2.
But that statement must be understood as extending only to that segment of the industry
where asexual propagation of new varieties was the convention for commercializing
products. Id. at 1 (stating that the bill would provide patent protection only for new plant
varieties asexually reproduced). That was (and is) true of the nursery industry, but not
the seed industry.
35.
Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(clarifying that patent protection applies to asexually reproduced plants, while the PVPA
applies to sexually reproduced plants).
36.
See id. at 1567-68. This is so even if the resulting meaning of the term "variety"
in the Plant Patent Act regime is different from that in the PVPA regime. Id. The PVPA
concept extends to a plant grouping, rather than being limited to a discrete identifiable
plant. See infra Part II.C for an explanation of the PVPA concept of "variety."
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a plant patent requires an actual physical taking from the
patented plant. 7
For U.S. law purposes, then, the plant patent legislation
created a distinction between plants propagated asexually and
plants reproduced via seed. It might be tempting to view the
distinction as inevitable, flowing as a matter of necessity from
the intrinsic qualities of plants. By extension, the appearance of
sui generis plant variety regimes would likewise seem to rest on a
straightforward, biological rationale.
In fact, the introduction of the asexual/sexual distinction in
U.S. plant intellectual property law was as much a matter of
political expediency as it was a matter of biology, as a careful
analysis of the history of the plant patent legislation reveals. 8
Major nursery operators-whose
varieties were easily
propagated asexually39-comprised the chief lobbying influence
advocating patent protection for plant innovation, and put
recognition of plant breeding as "invention" on equal footing with
invention in other industrial sectors. 40 By contrast, seed
companies saw themselves predominantly as brokers rather than
as developers of new varieties.4 1 In addition, the nursery
operators dealt in ornamentals and fruits, while the seed
companies dealt in staples of the food supply. 42 One may assume
that patent protection extending to the latter may have been
politically unpalatable at the outset of the Great Depression. 43
In any event, the best historical study makes clear that the
nursery operators persuaded seed companies to drop efforts to
secure patent legislation expressly encompassing seed-grown
plants.44 Political considerations suggested that plant breeders
should "get established the principle that Congress recognized
the rights of the plant breeder" by lobbying for the limited
37.
That is, it is not sufficient that the alleged infringing plant merely has the same
essential characteristics as the patented plant. See Imazio Nursery, 69 F.3d at 1569-70.
38.
Professor Cary Fowler has provided an insightful study of the subject. See
generally Cary Fowler, The Plant Patent Act of 1930: A Sociological History of its
Creation,82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK, OFF. SOc'Y 621 (2000).
39. See id. at 625-26 (explaining a simple method for asexually reproducing a fruit
tree).
40. Id. at 634, 636 (relating the lobbying efforts of nursery operators).
41.
Id. at 633 (noting that members of the American Seed Trade Ass'n referred to
themselves as "traders" of seed, but rarely referred to themselves as "breeders").
42.
Id. at 624-25.
43.
See, e.g., Edwin M. Thomas, Outline of the History of the United States Patent
Office: Legislative Changes Since 1836, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 103, 122 (1936) (chapter
within special July 1936 centennial supplement) (asserting that the asexual reproduction
limitation reflected reluctance to create "monopolies upon the cereal grains or any
improvements thereof").
44.
Fowler, supra note 38, at 634-35.

2002]

U.S. PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION

737

protection afforded by the plant patent legislation. Future
lobbying energies could be directed towards "get[ting] protection
also for seed propagated plants which would be much easier after
this fundamental principle was established."45 At least one early
commentator shared the view that after the plant patent law had
"begun to function smoothly, justice demands that it be extended
to cover sexually reproduced varieties. 4 6
It is tempting, in hindsight, to conclude that Congress made
a carefully considered decision to direct asexually propagated
plants into the patent system, leaving sexually propagated plants
for later protection under sui generis variety protection.4 7 But this
plainly attributes to Congress a more coherent vision than the
historical facts support. Plant variety protection in the United
States owes its existence as much (or more) to expediency in the
politics of plant patenting as to a clear-eyed normative vision of
the appropriate range of protection for types of plant
innovation.48
As late as the 1960s, Congress was still considering the
possibility of express legislation confirming that the patent
regime extended to seed-grown plants.49 In 1966, the President's
Commission on the Patent System recommended deleting from
the patent statute all provisions relating to plants and providing
"another form of protection," on the grounds that the Commission
"does not consider the patent system the proper vehicle for the
protection of [plant] subject matter, regardless of whether the
plants reproduce sexually or asexually.""0 In subsequent hearings
45.
1909 PROC. OF THE AM. SEED TRADE ASS'N 66 (quoting Paul Stark of Stark Bros.
Nurseries), quoted in Fowler, supra note 38, at 635.
46.
Robert C. Cook, Applying the Plant Patent Law, 21 J. OF HEREDITY 361, 369
(1930), reprinted in Joseph Rossman, Plant Patents, 13 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 7, 25 (1931)
(observing that "this is the field most needing patent protection for no sexually
reproduced variety can possibly be the result of casual hybridization, or a chance find, as
are many varieties in the field covered by the present law").
47.
Indeed, the J.E.M. petitioners offered arguments consistent with this view. See
J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130-36 (2001) (citing
petitioners' unsuccessful arguments); see also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text
(discussing J.E.M. in depth).
48.
The plant patent legislation did contribute doctrinally to sui generis plant
variety protection systems. The plant patent legislation introduced the notion of
"distinctness," later appropriated for use in sui generis systems in Germany and,
ultimately, in the United States. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
49.
See For the Patent Law Revision Part 2: Hearings on S. 2, S. 1042, S. 1377, S.
1691, S. 2164, and S. 2597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 637, 639 (1968) [hereinafter Patent Law
Revision Part 2].
50.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS
OF ...USEFUL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 12-13 (1966)
(Recommendation IV), reprinted in General Revision of the Patent Laws Part 1: Hearings
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on legislation that would have implemented a variety of
recommendations from the Commission Report, the Senate heard
testimony on a proposed amendment that would have run
precisely contrary to the Commission's recommendation.5 '
Proposed Amendment 511 to Senate Bill 1042 would have
amended the asexual reproduction requirement to extend to
reproduction "asexually or sexually,", 2 thus expressly bringing
seed-grown plants into the utility patent regime on equal terms
with asexually propagated varieties.
Proponents of the amendment argued that when the Plant
Patent Act was enacted in 1930, plant breeding "based on the
scientific application of genetics, pathology, physiology,
cytogenetics, and related disciplines, was still in its infancy."53
However, plant breeding had evolved significantly, to a point
where "the varietal identity of a sexually reproduced plant can be
maintained intact over an extended period of time." 4
This argument could not overcome substantial opposition to
the proposed amendment. Paul Stark, the nursery operator who
had lobbied for passage of the Plant Patent Act, again played a
role. He was opposed to the amendment but apparently would
have supported a separate patent regime for seed-grown plants.55
He took issue with the proposition that seed-grown plants could
reliably be described and identified as discrete varieties, claiming6
that seed-grown plants exhibited inherent genetic variability.F
His overriding concern, however, was preservation of the existing
protection for asexually propagated plants.5 7 He seemed
especially concerned that the amended language would cause the
entire regime of patents for plants to be scrutinized afresh, and
possibly eliminated. 8
on H.R. 5924, H.R. 13951, and Related Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 1, 70-71 (1968). The National Council of Commercial Plant
Breeders speculated in a 1968 position paper that the Commission was unduly concerned
with the Patent Office's failure to apply the nonobviousness standard in plant cases.
National Council of Commercial Plant Breeders, Legal Protectionfor New Plant Varieties
Which Reproduce Sexually, reprinted in Patent Law Revision Part 2, supra note 49, at
648-49 (alleging that the President's Commission failed to support its claims that new
plant varieties "do not involve 'unobviousness').
51.
PatentLaw Revision Part2, supra note 49, at 639-48.
52.
Id. at 639 (emphasis added).
53.
Id. at 640 (statement of Floyd Ingersoll, President, American Seed Trade Ass'n).
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 865 (asserting that the "best interest"of asexual plant producers would be
in "much less danger"if seed-grown plants were included "in a separate additional section
of the patent act").
56. Id. at 866.
57.
Id. at 865.
58.
ld. at 866 ("If whole Plant Patent Act failed as a result of the seed amendment
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The 1968 proposal is plainly of significance to the ultimate
introduction, only two years later, of a plant variety protection
regime. It seems clear that opposition to the 1968 proposal
stimulated efforts to attain protection via a sui generis plant
variety system. 9
C. Sui Generis Approach: "Variety" Protection
In the United States, efforts to secure specialized trademark
and patent protection for plants supply the backdrop for
understanding the proposals that eventually matured into the
PVPA. Outside the United States, national and international
experiments with sui generis plant variety protection provided
important antecedents for the U.S. PVPA, and supplied an
additional rationale for U.S. adoption of plant variety protection:
reciprocity. °
Among the earliest predecessors of modern plant variety
protection regimes, and perhaps the most important, was the
1953 German seed law.6' The 1953 Act shares several defining
characteristics with many subsequent plant variety protection
regimes: it articulated patent-like aspirations,62 but (1) exempted
breeding activity from liability, thereby failing to provide patentlike scope of protection; 3 (2) relied on concepts of originality and
to S. 1042, those interested in asexual reproduced plants in the present law would lose the
benefit of a sound constructive law and the seedsmen would lose out by insisting on tying
into a law in which their seed propagated plants did not 'qualify or fit and could not be
enforced.") (original emphasis omitted). In view of subsequent Supreme Court
developments, perhaps a more powerful argument would have been that such an
amendment was unnecessary as seed-grown plants were already being embraced within
35 U.S.C. § 101 under a proper construction.
59.
See, e.g., JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000 139 (1988) (linking the two events).
60.
A full account of the international developments concerning plant variety
protection is beyond the scope of this Article. The literature on plant variety rights in
Europe and under international law is voluminous. Particularly rich is the literature on
the European view of the proper demarcation between the utility patent system and the
plant variety system. We synthesize this literature and present an analysis of future
implications for U.S. law in Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan, Sui Generis Plant Variety
Protection Under International and European Law (forthcoming) (on file with the
Authors).
61.
For an English translation of the statutory text, see Patents. Law Concerning
Protection of the Seed of Cultivated Plants. Dated June 27, 1953, 54 PAT. & TRADEMARK
REV. 358-66 (1956) and 55 PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 3-12 (1956) [hereinafter 1953 Act]. A
Dutch breeders' rights law appeared earlier. Heitz, History of the UPOV,supra note 19, at
28 (describing the 1941 Breeders Ordinance of the Netherlands, published July 5, 1942).
The history of the 1953 German law is detailed in HANS NEUMEIER, SORTENSCHUTZ
UND/ODER PATENTSCHUTZ FUR PFLANZENZCCHTUNGEN (1990).
62.
1953 Act, supra note 61, art. 1, at 358 (stating a purpose of "promoting the
breeding of new high-class varieties of cultivated plants").
63.
The Act afforded exclusive rights that were facially broad. 1953 Act, supra note
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stability as prerequisites for obtaining protection, eschewing
critical patent prerequisites
such as inventive step
(nonobviousness); 4 and (3) left unsettled the issue of dual
protection under variety regimes and patent regimes.65
A variant of the German concept of plant variety rights
subsequently became enshrined in international law in the form
of the International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants (UPOV). 66 The 1961 UPOV text (1) expressly

subjected plant variety rights to a breeders' exemption;67
61, art. 6(1), at 360 ("[O]nly the holder or the variety protection license[e] ... is entitled to
produce commercially seed ... of the protected variety for the purpose of marketing it, to
offer such seed for sale or to put it into circulation."). At the same time, the Act expressly
limited these exclusive rights by an exemption for breeding new varieties. Id. ("Seed of
the protected variety may be used for the purpose of breeding a new variety and the seed
of the new variety may be used in accordance with Sentence 1 without the consent of the
licensee.").
64.
Article 2(1) set forth the protection prerequisites: "Protection is granted in
respect of any variety of cultivated plant which has been obtained by selective breeding
provided that the variety is: (1) Original and stable. (2) Of agricultural or horticultural
value. (3) Duly entered in the Register of Species." 1953 Act, supra note 61, art. 2(1), at
358-59. The Act defined originality as a function of the distinctness of the variety's
"morphological or physiological characteristics," a standard that may have been borrowed
from U.S. plant patent law. See Heitz, History of the UPOV, supra note 19, at 27 (noting
that the distinctness standard first appeared in Germany in a 1930 draft Seed and
Seedlings law, contemporaneously with its appearance in the 1930 U.S. plant patent
legislation).
65.
The 1953 Act did not expressly operate to the exclusion of other intellectual
property regimes, either trademark or patent-that is, it did not contain any express dual
protection prohibition. However, under Article 68, rights acquired under other regimes
could only be exercised to the extent that they did not vary from the provisions of the 1953
Act. See Andre Heitz, The History of Plant Variety Protection,in THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NEW VARIETIES OF
PLANTS 53, 75 (UPOV 1987) (discussing the German seed law and its impact on the
UPOV Convention) [hereinafter Heitz, Plant Variety Protection]. According to one
commentator, this meant that "cumulative protection was not actually prohibited, but
simply made uninteresting." Id.
66.
The acronym indicates the French-language title of the treaty and its governing
organization (Union Internationale pour la Protection des Obtentions Vegetales).
Delegates from several European nations met in Paris in 1957, and again in 1961, to
create an international treaty for plant variety protection. For a compilation of documents
circulated at the 1957 and 1961 conferences at which the UPOV was conceived, see ACTES
DES CONFERENCES INTERNATIONALES POUR LA PROTECTION DES OBTENTIONS VEGETALES
1957-1961 (Pub. No. 316) (UPOV 1974). A handful of European countries signed and
ratified the 1961 text over the course of the 1960s and into the 1970s. Act of 1961,
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (official English
transl.) (1961), at http://www.upov.org/eng/convntns/1961/act1961.htm (last visited Sept.
16, 2002) [hereinafter 1961 UPOV]. The text was modified in 1972 and 1978, with further,
extensive modifications in 1991. Act of 1991, International Convention for the Protection
of New Varieties of Plants (official English transl.) (1991), at http://www.upov.org/
eng/convntns/1991/act1991.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2002) [hereinafter 1991 UPOVI. See
generally Barry Greengrass, The 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention, 12 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 466 (1991).
67.
See 1961 UPOV, supra note 66, art. 5(3):
Authorization by the breeder or his successor in title shall not be required either
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(2)
adopted distinctness
and
stability
as
protection
prerequisites;6 8 and (3) sent conflicting signals regarding the dual
protection issue.6 9

for the utilization of the new variety as an initial source of variation for the
purpose of creating other new varieties or for the marketing of such varieties.
Such authorization shall be required, however, when the repeated use of the new
variety is necessary for the commercial production of another variety.
The 1991 UPOV text reorganized and added to the exemptions, describing three
"compulsory exceptions": a non-commercial purposes exception, an experimental purposes
exception, and a breeders' exception. 1991 UPOV, supra note 66, art. 15(1)(i)-(iii). The
text also set forth an optional exception relating to farmers' saved seed. Id. art. 15(2). For
counterpart PVPA provisions, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
68. The UPOV text as ultimately adopted in 1961 required that the new variety be
'clearly distinguishable" and "stable." 1961 UPOV, supra note 66, art. 6(1)(a), (d). The
distinctness criterion has roots in U.S. plant patent law. See Heitz, History of the UPOV,
supra note 19, at 37 (pointing out that at the first session of the Diplomatic Conference of
the UPOV in 1957, the negotiators adopted the criterion of distinctness, borrowed from
the 1930 U.S. plant patent legislation, as one of the central protection prerequisites).
The UPOV also added requirements for uniformity and novelty. See 1961
UPOV, supra note 66, art. 6(1)(c) (requiring the variety to be "sufficiently homogeneous,"
corresponding to modern requirements for "uniformity"); id. art. 6(1)(b) (imposing a
novelty requirement with no grace-period).
The current incarnation of UPOV-the 1991 text-still relies upon novelty and
the distinctness/uniformity/stability ("DUS") criteria as the substantive conditions for
protection. See 1991 UPOV, supra note 66, art. 5(1). The 1991 text also contains separate
definitions for some concepts, such as stability (defined as being satisfied when "relevant
characteristics remain unchanged after repeated propagation"), id. art. 9, and uniformity
(defined circularly as "sufficiently uniform in its relevant characteristics"), id. art. 8. See
infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of U.S. PVPA counterpart
provisions.
69. Reportedly, the delegates to the 1957 and 1961 UPOV conventions were inclined
to leave the dual protection question to the member states. See, e.g., Heitz, History of
UPOV, supra note 19, at 40 ("[T]hroughout the preparatory work, the consensus among
the experts was that member States should be free to choose the form of protection
deemed most appropriate to their national circumstances."). Nonetheless, parallel
negotiations over utility patent law harmonization arrived at a different solution: exclude
plant varieties from the utility patent system, setting up sui generis variety protection as
the exclusive form of protection for varieties. Id. at 33-34 & n.62 (quoting a 1960 report
from the Rapporteur-General to the Committee of Experts on Patents and concluding that
the Rapporteur viewed work on a sui generis plant variety scheme as incidental to the
work on patent harmonization). Accordingly, perhaps as a product of the realpolitik of
international patent law harmonization, the 1961 text of the UPOV included a double
protection prohibition. Id. at 41. Under the relevant provision:
Each member State of the Union may recognise the right of the breeder provided
for in this Convention by the grant either of a special title of protection or of a
patent. Nevertheless, a member State of the Union whose national law admits of
protection under both these forms may provide only one of them for one and the
same botanical genus or species.
1961 UPOV, supra note 66, art. 2(1).
The politics of plant variety protection had shifted sufficiently by 1991 so that the
UPOV dual protection prohibition was eliminated. See Greengrass, supra note 66, at 467
(explaining that under the 1991 UPOV text, members are free to decide whether to grant
patents in addition to breeders' rights, whether to require applicants to elect between the two
regimes, and how to resolve any conflicts between the regimes).
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Currently, the concept of plant variety rights is firmly
established in world intellectual property law, for example in
the TRIPS Agreement," and at the Community level in
Europe.7 By December 2001, UPOV membership had swelled

to fifty countries."
Plant variety protection is also now a fixture of U.S. law, the
U.S. PVPA having been enacted in 1970 after only the briefest of
debate. 73 Like its European forebears, the PVPA expresses
patent-like pretensions, specifying explicitly that the "intent of
Congress" in providing PVPA protection is "to afford adequate
encouragement for research, and for marketing when
appropriate, to yield for the public the benefits of new varieties."74
Other pronouncements in the legislative history promised
improvements in crop quality and even increases in private
sector plant breeding jobs.
70.
The TRIPS Agreement explicitly offers plant variety protection as an acceptable
means for (and substitute for, at the state's discretion) patent protection for plant
varieties. See supra note 6 (citing the relevant provision). For a discussion, see S.K.
Verma, TRIPs and Plant Variety Protection in Developing Countries, 6 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 281 (1995). The literature on this topic is also becoming quite large.
71.
National breeders' rights regimes in various European countries now exist
concurrently with a Community-wide plant variety rights regime. Council Regulation
2100/94, arts. 1-35 1994 OJ (L227/1). See P.A.C.E. VAN DER KOOiJ, INTRODUCTION TO THE
EC REGULATION ON PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION (1997) (providing a detailed
commentary). See generally Timothy Millett, The Community System of Plant Variety
Rights, 24 EUR. L. REV. 231 (1999) (providing an excellent summary). Article 3 of
Regulation 2100 provides that member states can continue to provide national breeders'
rights, but Article 92(1) proscribes protection for the same variety under both systems.
72.
Press Release No. 49, UPOV, Republic of Korea Accedes to the UPOV
Convention (Dec. 7, 2001), at 1 (indicating that Korea become the fiftieth UPOV member),
at http://www.upov.org/eng/prssrlss/49.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2002).
73.
This is not to suggest that the concept of breeders' rights went unnoticed in the
United States prior to the introduction of the PVPA legislation. Serious discussions on the
desirability of plant breeders' rights in seed industry circles appeared at least as early as
1964. See generally Symposium, Plant Breeders' Rights, THE CROP SCI. SOC'Y OF AM.,
(Mar. 1964) (recording the largely negative reaction among U.S. commentators to the
concept of breeders' rights).
More directly, Congress was not without help in drafting the bill. In 1969, the
American Seed Trade Ass'n drafted a plant variety protection proposal, which became the
basis for the PVPA. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 59, at 139.
74.
7 U.S.C. § 2581 (2000) (proceeding to defend the constitutionality of the PVPA
on either Commerce Clause or Intellectual Property Clause grounds); see also Plant
Variety ProtectionAct: Hearing on S. 3070 Before the Subcomm. on Agric. Res. & Gen.
Legis. of the Senate Comm. on Agric. & Forestry, 91st Cong. 47 (1970) [hereinafter 1970
Senate Hearing](statement of Hon. Jack Miller, U.S. Senator, Iowa) ("The bill under your
consideration is designed to encourage the development of new varieties of sexually
reproduced plants by providing protection for those who breed and develop them, thus
promoting the growth and well-being of agriculture."). See infra Part IV for our empirical
assessment of the performance of the PVPA vis-a-vis these patent-like ambitions.
75.
1970 Senate Hearing, supra note 74, at 55 (statement of Allenby L. White,
Chairman, Breeders' Rights Study Committee, American Seed Trade Ass'n) (asserting
that the PVPA would enhance the nation's soybean crop by making available more and
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In more recent PVPA legislative debates, the allegation that
the PVPA provides patent-like incentives has become
entrenched. For example, in hearings held in 1979-80, 76
defenders of the PVPA claimed that the PVPA was stimulating
investments in research because the number of new varieties had
increased for various crops since the passage of the PVPA.77
During the mid-1990s hearings, one Senator asserted that one
purpose for the PVPA is "to provide economic incentives for
companies to undertake the costs and risks inherent in producing
new varieties, 78 and the Senator further testified that "[t]he
success of the PVPA can be judged from the increase in private
sector research ...on plant breeding and the success of modern

varieties."79
Also reflecting the progression of European thought, the
PVPA emerged not because it was necessarily compelling on its
own merits, or because it was an inevitable complement to
existing patent protection, ° but because it appeared to be the
better varieties); see also id. at 73 (statement of Dr. J.W. Neely, Vice President, Coker's
Pedigree Seed Co.) (same). On predictions of job increases, see Plant Variety Protection:
Hearingon H.R. 13424, H.R. 13631, H.R. 13658, H.R. 13901, H.R. 14332, and H.R. 15226
Before the Subcomm. on Dep'tl Operations of the House Comm. on Agric., 91st Cong. 23
(1970) [hereinafter 1970 House Hearing] (statement of John S. Rogers, SecretaryTreasurer, National Council of Commercial Plant Breeders).
76.
The hearings transcripts are voluminous. See Plant Variety Protection Act
Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 999 Before the Subcomm. on Dep't Investigations,
Oversight, & Res. of the House Comm. on Agric., 96th Cong. iii-v (1980) [hereinafter 1980
House Hearings];Plant Variety ProtectionAct: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agric.
Res. & Gen. Legis. of the Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, 96th Cong. iii-iv
(1980). Coincidentally, the Senate hearings were held the day after the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,477 U.S. 303, 312-14 (1980), which
interpreted the Plant Patent Act and the PVPA as not foreclosing utility patent protection
for genetically-engineered microorganisms.
77.
1980 House Hearings, supra note 76, at 13-14. Opponents responded that the
PVPA was "increasing genetic uniformity, decreasing the preservation of germ plasm,
increasing the price of seed, and encouraging the formation of large monopolistic seed
companies," rhetoric that one might associate with claims of overbroad utility patent
protection. Id. at 10. See supra notes 62-64 for our critique of the argument that the
PVPA provides patent-like ex ante innovation incentives.
78.
Plant Variety ProtectionAct Amendments of 1993: Hearingon S. 1406 Before the
Subcomm. on Agric. Res., Conservation, Forestry, & Gen. Legis. of the Senate Comm. on
Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, 103d Cong. 2 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Senate Hearing].
79.
Id. (citing statistics reflecting variety numbers for various major crops). We
draw different conclusions from the evidence. See discussion infra Part IV.
For additional hearings on the mid-1990s proposals, see Plant Variety Protection
Act Amendments of 1993: Hearingon H.R. 2927 Before the Subcomm. on Dep't Operations
& Nutrition of the House Comm. on Agric., 103d Cong. (1994). The 1993-94 proposed
changes are detailed in H.R. REP. No. 103-699 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2423, 2423-39.
80. The report accompanying the Senate PVPA proposal did, however, attempt to
justify the PVPA as a complement to existing patent regimes:
Under the patent law, patent protection is limited to those varieties of plants
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politically least objectionable alternative when no consensus
could be found for including plants explicitly in the utility patent
statute. For example, an American Seed Trade Association
(ASTA) position paper indicates that ASTA enthusiasm for
proposing a sui generis system arose only after the failed effort in
1968 to amend the utility patent statute to recognize expressly
the eligibility of sexually reproduced plants.81
Finally, PVPA proponents were aware of the international
shift in favor of sui generis variety protection82 and undoubtedly
looked towards the prospect of eventual U.S. accession to the
UPOV,"3 which offered the benefits of national treatment 84 and a
twelve-month right of priority." Subsequent legislative debates
characterized the need for national treatment as one of the
purposes of enacting the PVPA,"6 and generally extolled the
benefits of UPOV membership:
New plant varieties grown and developed in the United
States are sold around the world, and foreign varieties are
well-known in the United States. UPOV's aim is facilitating
international agricultural trade. UPOV is a well-known
international forum for the improvement of plant breeding.
Without the availability of legal protection in foreign
countries, which UPOV helps provide, breeders would
hesitate or refuse to export their most valuable varieties. 87
which reproduce asexually ....No protection is available to those varieties of
plants which reproduce sexually .... Thus, patent protection is not available
with respect to new varieties of most of the economically important agricultural
crops, such as cotton or soybeans.
S. REP. No. 91-1246, at 3 (1970) (referring to the failed effort in the 1968 legislative
proposal to broaden the patent statute to apply to sexually reproduced plants, as
(apparently) another justification).
81. 1970 House Hearing,supra note 75, at 55-56.
82.
Id. at 44 (noting the signing of the 1961 UPOV and describing ratification
status); see also 1970 Senate Hearing,supra note 74, at 54 (statement of Allenby L. White,
Chairman, Breeders' Rights Study Committee, American Seed Trade Ass'n):
That the principle of legal protection for plant varieties is a sound one seems
beyond dispute. This belief.., seems amply supported by [U.S. law] . . . , and by
the fact that the western European nations, and other nations, have accepted
this principle to the extent of entering into regional conventions and enacting
national laws codifying the basic principle.
83.
The first ratifications of the 1961 UPOV text occurred in the mid- to late-1960s.
Heitz, Plant Variety Protection,supra note 65, at 89.
84.
1961 UPOV, supra note 66, art. 3. For the current UPOV provision, see 1991
UPOV, supra note 66, art. 4.
85.
1961 UPOV,supra note 66, art. 12(1). For the current UPOV provision, see 1991
UPOV, supra note 66, art. 11(1).
86.
1993 Senate Hearing,supra note 78, at 2 ("The PVPA was enacted in 1970 ...to
alleviate the competitive disadvantage that American agriculture and breeders face
because European countries offered protection under UPOV.").
87.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1115, 96th Cong., at 7 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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Predictably, when the Clinton Administration finally
submitted the 1991 text of the UPOV treaty to the Senate for
ratification, the Administration emphasized the benefits of the
PVPA as a reciprocity vehicle.88 The United States did eventually
join the UPOV, perhaps guaranteeing the continued existence of
the U.S. PVPA in some form. 89
III. ESSENTIAL TRAITS OF THE MODERN
PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT

We next take up an analysis of the modern PVPA,
considering in this section its essential doctrinal features, and
turning in the next section to an empirical analysis. Like most
other intellectual property regimes, the PVPA can be understood
in simplified terms as a function of four variables: (1)
protectability requirements; (2) scope of rights; (3) limitations on
scope; and (4) term of protection.
A. ProtectabilityRequirements
The protected subject matter in a PVP certificate is a
discrete plant "variety"-that is, "a plant grouping within a
single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank."" Any sexually
6954,6959.
88.

See S. COMM. FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

PLANTS, S. ExEc. REP. NO. 105-15, at 2 (1998) (asserting that the PVPA was enacted "to
promote the development of new varieties of agricultural grain crops, without which the
U.S. agriculture business would be at a disadvantage compared to its counterpart in other
countries with new plant variety protection policies"). The Report proceeds to elaborate on
this rationale:
In non-UPOV countries, farmers freely sell harvested grain as seed to others, in
effect competing with plant breeders by taking unfair and free advantage of
their efforts in developing new plant varieties. This seriously erodes the ability
of firms to recoup their investment in research and development of new
advanced strains. This has a chilling effect on the prospects for developing
advanced varieties and on research and development of new strains for local
markets. Currently, many non-UPOV countries do not have access to the latest,
most productive U.S. products.
Id. at6.
89. The United States became a party to the 1978 UPOV in 1981 by Executive
Agreement. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-699, at 9 (1994) (discussing proposed amendments in
1994 to the PVPA), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2423, 2425. The United States signed
the treaty in October 1991, but did not submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification
until late 1995. CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PLANTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 105-15,

at 1 (1998). The United States deposited its instrument of ratification on January 22,
1999, and it became effective on February 22, 1999. See Press Release No. 35, UPOV,
Ratification by the United States of America of the 1991 Act of the International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (Jan. 22, 1999), at 1, at
http://www.upov.org/eng/prssrlss/35.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2002).
90.
7 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(9) (2000). Under the complete statutory definition:
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reproduced variety is eligible for protection, provided that the
other protectability prerequisites are satisfied.9
The
PVPA imposes
four
substantive
protectability
requirements. First, the variety must be "new"--which, confusingly,
is actually a statutory bar provision, not a first-to-invent style
novelty provision-with a one-year grace period for most varieties.92
The remaining three requirements are the "DUS" criteria: the
variety must be distinct, 9 uniform,94 and stable.9

The term "variety" means a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the
lowest known rank, that, without regard to whether the conditions for plant
variety protection are fully met, can be defined by the expression of the
characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination of genotypes,
distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one
characteristic and considered as a unit with regard to the suitability of the plant
grouping for being propagated unchanged. A variety may be represented by seed,
transplants, plants, tubers, tissue culture plantlets, and other matter.

Id.
91.
Specifically, the statutory language provides that "any sexually reproduced or
tuber propagated plant variety (other than fungi or bacteria)" that have been reproduced
qualify as eligible subject matter. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a). Language that excluded F1 hybrids
from protection was deleted in 1994. H.R. REP. No. 103-699 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2423, 2427. Currently, 197 crop varieties are eligible subject matters for
PVP certificates. See Plant Variety Protection Office, Plant Variety Protected Crops, at
http://www.ars-grin.gov/cgi-bin/npgs/html/pvplist.pl (last visited July 17, 2002).
92.
7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)(1). The variety is required to be:
[N]ew, in the sense that, on the date of filing of the application for plant variety
protection, propagating or harvested material of the variety has not been sold or
otherwise disposed of to other persons, by or with the consent of the breeder, or the
successor in interest of the breeder, for purposes of exploitation of the variety(A) in the United States, more than 1 year prior to the date of filing, or
(B) in any area outside the United States(i) more than 4 years prior to the date of filing ...; or
(ii) in the case of a tree or vine, more than 6 years prior to the date of filing.

Id.
93.
Distinctness is closest to a patent law novelty requirement. See id. § 2402(a)(2)
(providing that a variety must be "distinct, in the sense that the variety is clearly
distinguishable from any other variety the existence of which is publicly known or a
matter of common knowledge at the time of the filing of the application"). The PVPA also
provides a further statutory definition of distinctness. Id. § 2401(b)(5) ("The distinctness
of one variety from another may be based on one or more identifiable morphological,
physiological, or other characteristics (including any characteristics evidenced by
processing or product characteristics ... ),with respect to which a difference in genealogy
may contribute evidence.").
94.
Id. § 2402(a)(3) (providing that a variety must be "uniform, in the sense that
any variations are describable, predictable, and commercially acceptable").
95.
Id. § 2402(a)(4) (providing that a variety must be "stable, in the sense that the
variety, when reproduced, will remain unchanged with regard to the essential and
distinctive characteristics of the variety with a reasonable degree of reliability
commensurate with that of varieties of the same category in which the same breeding
method is employed").
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The PVPA is not a registration system in form.96 The PVPA
requires pre-grant examination for compliance with the novelty
and DUS requirements as well as formal matters.97 Examination
is undertaken by an examiner in the PVP Office, an arm of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)." When the Office
refuses an application, applicants have a right of administrative
appeal99 and subsequent judicial appeal (either to federal district
court or to the Federal Circuit). 100
An application for a PVP certificate must evidence
compliance with the novelty and DUS requirements. That is, it
must contain a "statement of the basis of the claim of the
applicant that the variety is new "'°' and a "description of the
variety setting forth its distinctiveness, uniformity, and
stability."'0 2
The application must also be accompanied by a seed
deposit, 3 along with a declaration "that a viable sample of
basic seed (including any propagating material) necessary for
propagation of the variety will be deposited and replenished
periodically in a public repository." 4 Despite the reference to a
"public" repository, seed deposited in connection with a PVP

96.
Whether it operates like a registration system in practice is a question we
consider in Part IV infra (reporting empirical studies).
97.
7 U.S.C. § 2441; see also id. § 2442(a) (providing for examiner refusal of
applications and applicant response). For relevant regulations, see 7 C.FR. §§ 97.100(b),
97.105-108 (2002).
98.
7 U.S.C. § 2321 (detailing statutory authority for creation of the PVP Office).
99.
Id. § 2443 (providing that appeal is to the USDA Secretary, who shall "seek the
advice of the Plant Variety Protection Board"). The Board is comprised of "individuals
who are experts in various areas of varietal development," must include "farmer
representation," and must also be drawn "approximately equally from the private or seed
industry sector and from the [public] sector." Id. § 2327; see also 7 C.F.R. § 97.3. Unlike
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the Plant Variety Protection Board
operates in the manner of a "Board of Directors" dispensing policy guidance to the PVP
Office. See, e.g., Minutes: Plant Variety Protection Board Meeting (Nov. 14-15, 2001), at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/science/pvpo/brdmin.htm (last visited July 12, 2002).
100.
7 U.S.C. § 2461 (authorizing appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit); id. § 2462 (authorizing civil action against the USDA Secretary in the District
Court for the District of Columbia). The provisions are analogous to those found in the
utility patent statute. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 146 (2000).
101.
7 U.S.C. § 2422(3).
102.
Id. § 2422(2). The description must also include a "description of the genealogy
and breeding procedure, when known." Id. The PVP Office may require amplification to
the extent that the description is not "as complete as is reasonably possible." Id.
103.
7 C.F.R. § 97.6(d)(1) (requiring deposit of "[a]t least 2,500 seeds"). The PVP
Office then transfers the seeds to the Agricultural Research Service National Seed
Storage Laboratory (NSSL) in Fort Collins, Colorado, for long-term storage. See Plant
Variety Protection Office, Current News and Information, at http://www.ams.usda.gov/
science/PVPO/Current %20News/currentnews.htm (last updated May 23, 2002).
104.
7 U.S.C. § 2422(4).
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application is not accessible to the public. °5 The purpose of the
deposit is to maintain viability of the variety.106
Together, the requirements present at least two major
points of contrast with the requirements of utility patent law.
First, the PVP regime includes no counterpart to the utility
patent requirement of nonobviousness. 7 This is a significant
difference if one accepts that the nonobviousness criterion
performs the principal work of discriminating between patentworthy and patent-unworthy inventions.
Second, the PVP regime includes no adequacy of
disclosure requirements comparable to those found in utility
patent law's § 112.20 Specifically, the PVPA does not require
applicants to provide a teaching disclosure of the type that
would be required under the § 112 enablement standard.0 9
Likewise, the PVPA does not extract a disclosure that would
satisfy the § 112 written description requirement. 10
A duly issued PVP certificate is accorded a statutory
presumption of validity."' To our knowledge, there is no
authoritative ruling on whether clear and convincing evidence
is required to overcome the presumption of validity.
B. Scope of Rights
Like the utility patent statute, 2 the PVPA defines a broad
range of acts that qualify as infringement when performed without
authority."3 Eschewing the utility patent infringement provision's

105.
Plant Variety Protection Office: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.
ams.usda.gov/science/PVPO/FAQ/seedsamples.htm (last visited July 27, 2002) (indicating
that only the PVP Office has access to seed samples).
106.
1980 House Hearings,supra note 76, at 83.
107.
See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) (providing that obviousness is a bar to patentability);
see also supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (describing the four substantive
protectability requirements of the PVP regime).
108.
35 U.S.C. § 112.
109.
Thus, a PVP disclosure functions more like the specification of a design patent.
The PVP imposes a lesser drafting burden on applicants than does a utility patent
application. On the other hand, applicants lose the benefit of drafting a disclosure that
enables beyond the specifically-disclosed embodiments. See infra Part III.B for a
discussion of the scope of rights available under a PVP certificate.
110.
Compliance with the § 112 written description requirement for biological subject
matter is often affected by a deposit of a viable sample of the subject matter. While the
PVPA also requires a seed deposit, the PVPA-compliant deposit need never be made
available to the public. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Thus, the PVPAcompliant deposit is not directed towards performing the function attributed to a § 112compliant deposit: confirming that the applicant had possession of the claimed invention.
111.
7 U.S.C. § 2562(a) (2000).
112.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
113.
7 U.S.C. § 2541(a).
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more elegant reference to unauthorized "making, using, offering to
sell, selling, and importing,"114 the PVPA infringement provision
supplies a multiplicity of terms proscribing unauthorized transfers,
transactions, offers to transact, and the like." 5 In addition, the
PVPA proscribes unauthorized propagation of protected varieties," 6
as well as unauthorized conditioning of a variety for the purposes of
propagation."7 Finally, like the utility patent statute, the PVPA
prohibits indirect infringement."8
Unlike the utility patent scheme, however, the PVPA affords
the certificate holder practically no scope of protection beyond the
"disclosed embodiment"-that is, the discrete variety that is the
subject of the certificate."'9 Although the PVPA does extend
protection to any variety that is "essentially derived from a
protected variety,""' this provision does not operate analogously
to a patent law doctrine of equivalents. "Essentially derived
variety" is a term of relatively circumscribed statutory
definition"'. and may do little more than account for minor
114.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
115.
See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a). Section 2541(a)(1) is so broad as to extend to any
"transfer of possession" of protected seed, but the Federal Circuit has narrowed the reach
of this language. In Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers Corp., the Federal Circuit held that
"a passive third-party to a sales transaction, such as a ginner or a delinter, can be held
liable for infringement under 7 U.S.C. § 2541(1)," but only if the third party has scienter,
that is,knows or should reasonably know "that its unauthorized transfer of possession is
an infringing transaction, i.e., that the sale is not exempt under [§] 2543." 177 F.3d 1343,
1348-52 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
116.
7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(3).
117.
Id. § 2541(a)(7).
118.
Id. § 2541(a)(10) (declaring it an infringement to "instigate or actively induce"
any of the prohibited activities).
119.
The PVPA regime thus strikes a bargain that differs greatly from the bargain
struck under the utility patent statute. The utility patent statute offers potentially broad
rights but extracts a high-quality disclosure that is remote from the prior art to the extent
required by the nonobviousness criterion. In contrast, the PVPA offers extremely limited
rights in exchange for a low-quality disclosure. See Mark D. Janis & Jay P. Kesan,
Designing an Optimal Intellectual Property System for Plants: A U.S. Supreme Court
Debate, 19 NATURE/BIOTECH. 981, 982 (2001) (setting forth this argument).
120.
7 U.S.C. § 2541(c)(1). Specifically, the PVPA provides that its infringement
provisions extend to: "(1) any variety that is essentially derived from a protected variety,
unless the protected variety is an essentially derived variety; (2) any variety that is not
clearly distinguishable from a protected variety; [and] (3) any variety whose production
requires the repeated use of a protected variety." Id. § 2541(c)(1)-43).
121.
The term is defined very restrictively in the PVPA to extend only to two
generations of derivation:
(A) In General
The term "essentially derived variety" means a variety that(i) is predominantly derived from another variety (referred to in this
paragraph as the "initial variety") or from a variety that is predominantly
derived from the initial variety, while retaining the expression of the
essential characteristics that result from the genotype or combination of
genotypes of the initial variety;
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genetic reshuffling, which
is expected whenever a variety is
2
sexually propagated.
The legislative history also reflects an extremely narrow
conception of the scope of rights under a PVP certificate. In the
course of explaining the potential for infringement liability prior
to the issuance of a PVP certificate, 121 the Senate Report on the
PVPA legislation likens the PVPA to copyright law."1 According
to the Report, PVPA infringement "is expected almost never to be
by independent work, but by willful reproduction starting from
the protected variety itself."'
These rights must be enforced by civil action.126 Federal
district courts have original, exclusive jurisdiction over civil
actions arising under the PVPA, 127 and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit takes exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
PVPA enforcement actions.128
(ii) is clearly distinguishable from the initial variety; and
(iii) except for differences that result from the act of derivation, conforms to
the initial variety in the expression of the essential characteristics that
result from the genotype or combination of genotypes of the initial variety.
(B) Methods
An essentially derived variety may be obtained by the selection of a natural
or induced mutant or of a somaclonal variant, the selection of a variant
individual from plants of the initial variety, backcrossing, transformation
by genetic engineering, or other method.
Id. § 2401(a)(3).
The Supreme Court observed in J.E.M. that "[piractically, this means that
hybrids created from protected plant varieties are also protected." J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc.
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 140 (2001).
The "essentially derived variety" term first appeared in the 1991 UPOV text.
See 1991 UPOV, supra note 66, art. 14(5); see also Greengrass, supra note 66, at 470-71
(explaining that the essentially derived variety provision was added to the 1991 UPOV
text to remedy a loophole in the 1978 UPOV text in which an existing protected variety
could be used as a source of initial variation, and a variety selected from it could be
exploited without any obligation to the breeder of the protected variety, as long as the
selection was clearly distinguishable from the protected variety by at least one important
characteristic). It was incorporated into the U.S. PVPA in 1994. Plant Variety Protection
Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-341, 108 Stat. 3136, 3136-37 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
122.
See infra note 146 and accompanying text for additional discussion. The
essentially derived variety (EDV) criterion has not yet been litigated in the United States.
123.
See infra note 126 and accompanying text for an explanation of the relevant
statutory provision.
124.
S. REP. No. 91-1138, at 11 (1970) (observing that the PVPA infringement
provision "more resembles copyright law than patent law").
125.
Id.
126.
7 U.S.C. § 2561 (providing a remedy by civil action for infringement under the
PVPA).
127.
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). For a rare example of a civil suit to enforce a PVP
certificate, see Heart Seed Co. v. Seeds, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1234 (E.D. Wash. 1987),
available at 1987 WL 41982.
128.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(8) (granting exclusive jurisdiction over "an appeal under
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C. Limitations on Rights
The exclusionary rights under the PVP regime are subject to a
multiplicity of limitations and exceptions that extend well beyond
those found in the utility patent regime. First, the PVPA includes
an explicit statutory safe harbor provision shielding from
infringement "any act done privately and for noncommercial
purposes."'' 9 In addition, the PVPA includes a separate provision
exempting from infringement "It]he use and reproduction of a
protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research."'3 °
This surely must reach "plant breeding" and "bona fide research,"
even if carried out for purely commercial purposes. The presence of
a research exemption separate from the noncommercial acts
exemption may suggest that a competing plant breeder can
appropriate a protected variety without authority, use it in a
breeding program to develop new commercial varieties (that are not
"essentially derived varieties"), and be free of any PVPA liability.
Further still, the PVPA contains vexing language that prohibits the
use of a protected variety in "producing" a hybrid or different
variety, but allows the use of a protected variety in "developing" a
hybrid or different variety."'
PVP rights are also limited by a statutory "saved seed"
exemption, which allows farmers who grow protected varieties
(obtained through authorized sources) to save the resulting seed
132
for the production of a subsequent crop "for use on the farm.'

section 71 of the Plant Variety Protection Act (7 U.S.C. § 2461)").
129.
7 U.S.C. § 2541(e). By contrast, the U.S. utility patent scheme includes only a
weak, common-law doctrine of non-commercial experimental use. See Janis, Sustainable
Agriculture, supra note 7, at 105-17 (discussing the experimental use doctrine).
130.
7 U.S.C. § 2544.
131.
Id. § 2541(a)(4). According to the PVPA legislative history:
Producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety means
that use of the protected variety in producing the commercial class of seed of a
variety constitutes infringement. Use of the protected variety as one source of
germ plasm to breed a novel variety is permissible. As an example, the use of a
protected inbred line of corn to cross it with another inbred line to produce a
hybrid for commercial use, or production of a composite variety which is
repeatedly reconstituted for commercial sale by intercrossing a set of seed lines
one of which is protected, shall constitute an infringement. The use of such
inbred line for hybridization withother materials to develop through breeding a
novel inbred line as provided in section 114 [7 U.S.C. § 2544, the experimental
use provision], however, does not constitute infringement; nor does the
production of such new inbred line for the general market constitute
infringement.
H.R. REP. No. 91-1605, at 11 (1970).
132.
7 U.S.C. § 2543. The saved seed exemption also allows farmers to engage in "bona
fide" sales of saved seed "for other than reproductive purposes." Id.; see also id. § 2401(b)(1)
(defining the concept of bona fide sale for "nonreproductive purposes").
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The saved seed exemption is one of the few PVPA provisions to
have been the subject of extended litigation.188
In addition to this extensive series of exemptions, PVP rights
are also subject to a compulsory licensing requirement.' Twoyear compulsory licenses, at a reasonable royalty, may be
granted where the USDA Secretary declares that such a license
would serve the public interest in maintaining an adequate food
supply. 135

D. Term of Protection
A PVP certificate remains in force for twenty years (for most
varieties) 16 or twenty-five years (for trees and vines)," 7 measured
from the date of certificate issuance. The PVPA also contains an
"anti-submarine" provision authorizing the USDA Secretary to
shorten a PVP certificate term to the extent that the applicant
has delayed prosecution.'3 8

Concerning

the

prospect

of

collecting

damages

for

infringements occurring prior to certificate issuance, the PVPA is
133.
See Agrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 183-84 (1995) (refusing to extend
the saved seed exemption to certain sales of "brown-bagged" seed).
134.
Under 7 U.S.C. § 2404:
The Secretary may declare a protected variety open to use on a basis of equitable
remuneration to the owner, not less than a reasonable royalty, when the
Secretary determines that such declaration is necessary in order to insure an
adequate supply of fiber, food, or feed in this country and that the owner is
unwilling or unable to supply the public needs for the variety at a price which
may reasonably be deemed fair. Such declaration may be, with or without
limitation, with or without designation of what the remuneration is to be; and
shall be subject to review as under section 2461 or 2462... (any finding that the
price is not reasonable being reviewable), and shall remain in effect not more
than two years. In the event litigation is required to collect such remuneration, a
higher rate may be allowed by the court.
7 U.S.C. § 2404.
135.
Id.
136.
Id. § 2483(b)(1).
137.
Id. § 2483(b)(1)(B).
138.
Id. § 2483(b)(2) ("If the certificate is not issued within three years from the effective
filing date, the Secretary may shorten the term by the amount of delay in the prosecution of the
application attributed by the Secretary to the applicant."). Such a provision may have been
deemed necessary because the PVP term is measured from certificate issuance, and PVP
applications are maintained in confidence by the PVP Office until issuance. Id. § 2426
(specifying confidentiality but allowing for the USDA Secretary to publish specified information
about pending applications); 7 C.F.R. § 97.19 (2002) (detailing information about pending
applications that may be published, including the variety name and the applicant name).
However, given the relatively benign nature of the application prerequisites, it is not
clear to us that very much prosecution occurs in a typical PVP application in any event, and so it
would seem that there would be little opportunity for applicant delay even if applicants were so
inclined. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis suggests that certificate issuance is surprisingly
slow, and our anecdotal information suggests that the delay may be attributable to the PVP
Office. See infra Part IV.A.
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equivocal.1 39 On one hand, acts occurring after the variety owner
distributes the variety with notice can qualify as infringing acts
under the PVPA's main infringement provision.'
On the other
hand, as to innocent infringers whose acts precede the date of PVP
certificate issuance, courts have discretion to deny any damages.'
In other respects, however, the available remedies closely track
those available under utility patent law.' PVP certificates are also
subject to a time-limited reexamination procedure, 3 and the
statute also includes an interference provision.'
IV. PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION:
EMPIRICAL AND ANECDOTAL STUDIES

In this section, we present an empirical study of the
acquisition, licensing, and enforcement of PVPA rights, analyzing
data from the last thirty years of experience with this
139. This strikes us as a significant disappointment. One advantage typically attributed to
low-level, porous intellectual property regimes is that they may confer rights quickly. Indeed,
under the copyright system, rights vest upon fixation in a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(2000). By contrast, the PVPA does not definitively confer rights (in terms of a guaranteed
damages award) until certificate issuance, and our empirical study demonstrates that
applicants may await certificate issuance for surprisingly long times. See infra Part IV.A
(providing an empirical analysis of PVP application pendency times); see also supra note 124
(citing legislative history comparing PVPA protection to copyright protection).
140. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a).
141. Id. § 2564(d) ("As to infringement prior to, or resulting from a planting prior to,
issuance of a certificate for the infringed variety, a court finding the infringer to have established
innocent intentions, shall have discretion as to awarding damages.").
142. See id. § 2561 (providing remedy by civil action); id. § 2563 (authorizing injunctive
relief); id. § 2564(a) (authorizing award of damages with a reasonable royalty damages floor); id.
§ 2564(b) (authorizing damages enhancement up to three times the amount determined); id.
§ 2565 (authorizing award of attorney fees in "exceptional cases"); id. § 2566(a) (limiting
damages to no more than six years prior to filing of the complaint, and also denying recovery for
infi-ingements "known to the owner more than one year" prior to filing of the complaint); id.
§ 2567 (imposing a marking requirement). For comparable provisions under U.S. utility patent
law, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283-287 (2000). For a case analyzing damages under the PVPA, see
North Star Genetics, Ltd. v. Bata,which awarded lost profits damages and doubled the award.
No. CIV.A3-00-57, 2001 WL 1820380, at *4, *6 (D.N.D. Aug. 9, 2001).
143. See 7 U.S.C. § 2501(a) (providing that within five years of certificate issuance, any
person may notify the USDA Secretary "in writing of facts which may have a bearing on the
protectability of the variety," and the Secretary has discretion to initiate a reexamination
proceeding). In the ordinary course, no third party participation in such proceedings is
contemplated. See id. § 2501(b) (providing that reexaminations proceed "pursuant to the same
procedures and with the same rights as for original examinations"). However, the Secretary
"may direct that the reexamination include such interparty proceedings as the Secretary shall
establish" in cases where the reexamination petitioner "makes a prima facie showing of facts
needing proof." Id. § 2501(c).
The implementing regulations arguably exceed this statutory authorization by
providing for the possibility of pre-grant protests as well as post-grant reexaminations. See 7
C.F.R. §§ 97.200-201.
144. 7 U.S.C. § 2504 (stating that a PVP certificate owner may have a civil action against
an owner of a certificate of the same variety).
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legislatively-created, technology-specific, intellectual property
regime.' 41 Our results indicate that the PVPA rights are
burdensome to acquire, and yet the expected post-issuance
licensing and enforcement activities common to any intellectual
property regime are virtually non-existent under this one.
A. EmpiricalAnalysis of the PVP Acquisition Processfor
Soybeans and Corn
This empirical section analyzes data provided by the PVP
Office concerning PVP certificates issued in the last thirty years
for soybean and for corn (including all three corn varieties listed
by the PVP Office: field corn, popcorn corn, and sweet corn). We
selected soybeans and corn as the exemplars for our study
because they allow us to make some interesting comparisons.
Soybeans are naturally self-pollinating and thus, are readily
subject to unauthorized replication. By contrast, corn is naturally
cross-pollinating and is generally sold as a hybrid and thus, is
less readily subject to unauthorized replication using ordinary
growing techniques.
We constructed an original data set by extracting relevant
information from all the PVP corn and soybean certificates
issued over a thirty-year period from February 2, 1971, to May
3, 2002.146 For the issued certificates, data regarding the issue
dates and the numbers of pages in the PVP certificates are
provided by the PVP Office.' 47 The data extracted from each
PVP certificate, if applicable, includes the following: the type
of crop, the entity applying for the PVP certificate, the date of
filing, the date of issuance, the current status of the PVP
certificate and the date on which the status was determined,
the years of protection, and the number of pages in the PVP
certificate. Next, using this constructed data set, we generated
descriptive statistics and summary statistics, performed
statistical survival analysis (for duration), and, finally,
analyzed the results.
The objective of this part of the study is to understand
specific details regarding the PVP acquisition process, such as
the types and distribution of the different dispositions of PVP
145.
See infra Part IV.A for an explanation of the methodology used in the empirical
study.
Information on these certificates can be obtained through the PVP Office
146.
website, at http://www.ars-grin.gov/cgi-bin/npgs/html/pvplist.pl (last visited Sept. 21,
2002).
147.
E.g., Plant Variety Protection Office, Plant Variety ProtectionNumber: 7100016,
at http://www.ars-grin.gov/cgi-bin/npgs/html/showpvp.pl?7100016 (last visited July 19,
2002).
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applications and the issuing and pending durations for
examination. In addition, we provide a brief, preliminary
analysis of the corn and soybean industries by analyzing the
number and character of PVP applicants for soybean and corn
and the size of their PVP portfolios, including both issued
certificates and pending applications. We investigate all these
and other related issues by using descriptive statistics,
generating summary statistics, and providing graphical
representations of the data.
1. Soybean PVPs. The filing dates of the applications for
soybean PVP certificates considered in this study range from
February 2, 1971, to May 3, 2002. The applications have eight
possible outcomes during and after PVP prosecution. An
application may be abandoned, ineligible, withdrawn, or
pending. Even if a certificate is issued, its issuee may decide to
abandon, to withdraw, or not to renew the certificate. The vast
majority of PVP applications survive the examination
process. 4 ' Nevertheless, a significant percentage (about 12 to
15%) of the applications are either abandoned or withdrawn by
the applicants during the course of prosecution.'4 9
As of May 3, 2002, 1343 applications for soybean PVP
certificates had been filed. The status of the dispositions of
these soybean PVP applications and issued certificates is
summarized in Figure 1 and Table 1. Excluding pending
applications, over 85% of the soybean applications successfully
issued as PVP certificates from February 2, 1971, to May 3,
2002. Approximately 13% of the applications were ineligible,
abandoned, or withdrawn at various stages in the course of
examination, and 11% of the applications are currently being
examined by the PVP Office.

148.
See infra Figures 1-2 (exhibiting the proportions of applications resulting in
issued PVP certificates for soybeans and corn, respectively).
149.
See infra Figures 1-2 (exhibiting the proportions of applications for PVP
certificates abandoned and withdrawn for soybeans and corn, respectively).
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TABLE 1
DISPOSITION OF APPLICATIONS FOR
PVP CERTIFICATES FOR SOYBEANS
Status

Counts

Certificate Abandoned

1

Ineligible

7

Certificate Withdrawn

8

Application Withdrawn

47

Application Abandoned

106

Application Pending

151

Certificate Expired

276

Certificate Issued

747

Total

1343

The soybean PVP applicants consist of various organizations;
109 companies, universities, and research institutes have applied
for soybean PVP certificates between February 2, 1971, and May 3,
2002. Major issuees of soybean PVP certificates with 100 or more
certificates are: Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (206); Novartis
Seeds, Inc. (100); and Asgrow Seed Co. (100). Thus, more than half
of the issued certificates are owned by these three companies.
Novartis Seeds, Inc. and Asgrow Seed Co. own a quarter each, and
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. owns more than two quarters of
the 55% of soybean certificates issued. The rest of the certificates
are almost evenly distributed among eleven companies,
universities, and research institutes. About 18% of the soybean PVP
certificates are owned by organizations, each of whom owns less
than ten PVP certificates.
2. Corn PVPs. The filing dates of the applications for
corn PVP certificates considered in this study range from April
4, 1972, to May 3, 2002.15° There have been 904 applications
150.
See Plant Variety Protection Office, Plant Variety Protected Crops (field
corn, popcorn corn, and sweet corn crops), at http://www.ars-grin.gov/cgi-bin/npgs/
html/pvplist.pl (last visited July 17, 2002).
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filed by fifty-two companies, universities, and research
institutes.' The issued certificates provide dates of issuance
and the numbers of pages in the certificates. As with the
soybean data, applications and certificates may be abandoned,
ineligible, or withdrawn. The status of the dispositions of corn
PVP certificates as of May 3, 2002, is shown in Table 2 and
Figure 2. Excluding pending applications, over 80% of the
applications successfully issued as PVP certificates. Unlike the
soybean PVP certificates, none of the corn PVP certificates had
been withdrawn. About 15% of the applications had been
withdrawn or abandoned as of the time of our study, while 17%
of the applications were still pending before the PVP Office.

TABLE 2
DISPOSITION OF APPLICATIONS FOR
PVP CERTIFICATES FOR CORN
Status

Counts

Ineligible

1

Certificate Expired

17

Application Withdrawn

61

Application Abandoned

69

Application Pending

152

Certificate Issued

604

Total

904

151.
See Table 2 and Figure 2 infra (showing the disposition of applications for PVP
certificates for corn).
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The major corn PVP certificate issuees are the following
four companies: Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.; Holden's
Foundation Seeds L.L.C.; DEKALB Genetics Corp.; and
Novartis Seeds, Inc. More than 60% of the effective corn PVP
certificates belong to two companies: Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc., and Holden's Foundation Seeds L.L.C.
Pioneer, however, overwhelmingly dominates the others in the
number of corn PVP certificates obtained. Another 12% of the
corn certificates are equally shared by DEKALB Genetics
Corp. and Novartis Seeds, Inc., followed by DEKALB Plant
Genetics, holding 4% of the certificates. The rest of the corn
PVP certificates are almost equally distributed among five
companies and research institutes, followed by another
twenty-two companies and research institutes, each of whom
owns less than ten PVP certificates.
Pending applications constitute 17% (152 applications) of
the total corn PVP applications, as of May 3, 2002.152 Almost

50% of the pending applications have been filed by DEKALB
Genetics Corp. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. and
Holden's Foundation Seeds L.L.C. follow with 20% and 14% of
the pending applications, respectively. The remaining 19% of
pending applications are shared by several companies, each of
whom has less than ten pending applications.
The total number of PVP applications filed has increased
from around 100 applications per year in the 1970s to a high of
about 440 applications in 1999. Since 1999, the total number of
PVP applications has decreased steadily, and in 2001, 292 new
applications were received by the PVP Office. In 2001, the PVP
Office completed examination of 743 files, and by the end of
2001, there were 1043 total pending applications. As shown in
Figure 3, the number of soybean and corn applications that
were issued track this overall trend of increasing number of
PVP applications from 1971 to the mid-1990s, with a
significant decline in the number of applications since 1999.

152.

See supra Table 2 and Figure 2.
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3. PVP Pendency Durationsfor Soybeans and Corn. Once
a PVP certificate is issued, the PVP Office records the issue
date and the number of pages of the certificate in addition to
the filing date of the application. 113 We now examine the

duration between the filing dates and the issue dates (referred
to as the issuing duration), along with the duration between
the filing dates and the end date of this data set, May 3, 2002
(referred to as the pending duration). One objective of this
analysis is to investigate whether the PVP Office's efforts to
simplify the PVP acquisition process have led to shorter
waiting periods for obtaining certificates of protection, at least
for soybean and corn PVP applications. A comparative figure of
merit to keep in mind is two to three years (730 days to 1095
days) because utility patents generally require two to three
years of prosecution in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Issuing durations are further examined in relation to the
numbers of pages in the issued PVP certificates because the
numbers of pages may be a meaningful indication of the
complexity of the PVP application, which would then be
reflected in the speed of the PVP application review process
employed by the PVP Office.
An analysis of the soybean PVP certificate data reveals
the following summary statistics of the minimum (min), the
maximum (max), the mean, the mode, and the standard
deviation (std. dev.) for issuing durations in days, pending
durations in days, and numbers of pages, as tabulated in Table
3. Table 3 shows that the issuing durations have a wide range
and their distribution is skewed to the left. The mean issuing
duration is slightly less than 600 days, indicating that on
average about one and a half years of examination was
required for soybean PVP certificates issued before May 3,
2002.

153.
E.g., Plant Variety Protection Office, Plant Variety Protection Number:
7100016, at http://www.ars-grin.gov/cgi-bin/npgs/html/showpvp.pl?7100016
(last
visited July 19, 2002).
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF DURATION DATA AND TOTAL
NUMBER OF PAGES FOR SOYBEAN PVP CERTIFICATES
Issuing
Durations in

Pending
Durations in

Days

Days

Min

58

74

2

Max

2359

2237

36

Mean

577.72

1196.35

10.60

Mode

502

1802

10

374.08

682.75

3.65

Std. Dev.

Numbers
of Pages

Pending durations have as wide a range as the issuing
durations for soybean PVP certificates, with an average
pending duration of almost 1200 days. Further, the
distribution of pending durations is skewed to the right,
instead of to the left as seen for the issuing durations. This
result indicates that, as of May 3, 2002, the duration of the
examination process for soybean applications has been
increasing significantly. The numbers of pages in the issued
soybean PVP certificates show a symmetric distribution, and
most of them are within a range of 7 to 14 pages.
Figure 4 reveals the correlation between the issuing
durations and the numbers of pages in the soybean PVP
certificates. This figure depicts a cluster of issuing durations
for certificates between 7 and 13 pages. The other issuing
durations are evenly dispersed among the rest of the numbers
of pages both below 7 pages and above 13 pages. This result
indicates a weak correlation between the issuing durations
and the numbers of pages in the PVP certificates for soybeans.
This indication is confirmed by their low Pearson's correlation
coefficient, which was found to be 0.004119.
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An analysis of the corn PVP certificate data indicates the
following summary statistics regarding issuing durations in days,
pending durations in days, and numbers of pages in the certificates,
as tabulated in Table 4. Issuing durations for corn PVP certificates
vary in a wide range, similar to what was seen with soybean PVP
certificates. Issuing durations for corn PVP certificates are,
however, a subset of those for soybean PVP certificates, as the
minimum issuing durations for corn PVP certificates are longer,
and the maximum issuing durations shorter, than those for soybean
PVP certificates. The distribution of the issuing durations for corn
PVP certificates is skewed to the right, which is the opposite of
what was seen for soybean PVP certificates. Because the mean of
the issuing durations for corn PVP certificates is around 625 days
and the -mode is above 1500 days, streamlining the PVP
examination process for corn varieties does not appear to have
succeeded in speeding up the overall issuing duration.

TABLE 4

SUMMARY STATISTICS OF DURATION DATA AND TOTAL
NUMBER OF PAGES FOR CORN PVP CERTIFICATES
Issuing

Pending

Numbers

Durations in
Days

Durations in
Days

of Pages

Min

134

39

7

Max

1810

1506

26

Mean

625

713.45

15

'Mode

1536

1439

13

376.87

460.35

3.59

Std. Dev.

Pending durations for applications for corn PVP
certificates as of May 3, 2002, are shorter than those for
soybean PVP certificates. The minimum and maximum
pending durations for applications for corn PVP certificates
are shorter than those for soybean PVP certificates. The mean
of the pending durations for the corn PVP applications is
slightly less than 714 days, while the mode is above 1400 days.
The distribution of the pending durations is also skewed to the
right, as were the pending applications for soybean PVP
certificates.
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The total numbers of pages in the corn PVP certificates exhibit
almost a symmetric distribution and indicate that most certificates
have total numbers of pages ranging from 12 to 19. A correlation
between the issuing durations and numbers of pages for corn PVP
certificates is shown in Figure 5. This figure depicts a concentration
of issuing durations for applications between 10 to 22 pages, and
fewer dispersed issuing durations both less than 10 pages and
greater than 22 pages. This indicates a weak correlation between
the issuing durations and the total numbers of pages for corn PVP
certificates. This implication is consistent with a Pearson's
correlation coefficient of 0.385014. As seen for the soybean PVP
certificates, these data do not support including the total number of
pages in a PVP certificate as a statistically significant covariate in a
model for the analysis of issuing and pending durations for PVP
certificates.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the median and mean issuing
durations for soybeans and corn PVP certificates, respectively, as a
function of their year of issuance. The overall trends for both corn
and soybean appear to track each other. The issuing durations
increased steadily from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s and then,
as the number of applications decreased in the recent past, the
issuing durations appear to have caught up and started decreasing
in the last couple of years. These data suggest that the issuing
duration may be systematically skewed year to year based on the
overall workload at the PVP Office in terms of the number of new
PVP applications filed each year. In addition, for each year, the
mean and median issuing durations for both corn and soybean are
quite close to each other, suggesting a normal distribution of issuing
durations for any particular year.
We can also estimate how long applications for soybean or corn
PVP certificates are likely to remain in examination in the PVP
Office. Assuming that the sample of durations in this study is
reasonably homogenous-that is, individual effects of the applicants
are negligible-Figure 8 shows the results from a computation of
the Kaplan-Meier survival (duration) estimators for soybean and
corn. The y-axis is a probability of obtaining a particular duration
for corn and soybean, and the x-axis is the duration in days. From
Figure 8, we can see that there is a higher probability of obtaining a
corn PVP certificate in less than 1000 days (approximately three
years) compared to a soybean PVP certificate. The probability of a
soybean PVP certificate taking more than 1000 days in examination
is also higher than that of a corn PVP certificate. Moreover, soybean
PVPs tend to have longer issuing and pending durations than those
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of corn.", In sum, soybean PVP certificates tend to take longer to
obtain compared to corn PVP certificates. The reasons for this
difference need to be explored further.
B. The Post-IssuancePVP Picture
In the last section, we saw that although the PVP
examination process is most likely to result in the applicant
receiving a PVP certificate, it is nonetheless laborious, timeconsuming, and not inexpensive. In this section, we study the
post-issuance activities of licensing and enforcement of PVP
certificates.
1. PVP Licensing. We have conducted extensive interviews
with a number of practicing attorneys in private law firms
representing agricultural biotechnology companies and with inhouse intellectual property counsel at DuPont/Pioneer to
determine the magnitude and extent of PVP licensing
activities.155 The unanimous consensus among our interviewees is
that the only licensing of plant varieties that is protected solely
by PVP certificates is standard "bag-tag" licensing that
accompanies routine sales of seed to growers.'56 For example,
DuPont/Pioneer has filed 410 PVP applications in the five-year
period from 1997 to 2001, and in the same period, it has been
granted 381 PVP certificates. 7 From the previous section, it is
clear that Pioneer has a very large portfolio of PVP certificates,
but it has neither licensed nor initiated infringement lawsuits
5
based solely on PVP certificates."
This PVP picture is in sharp contrast to the utility patent
picture for protecting plant innovation. In the same five-year
period from 1997 to 2001, DuPont/Pioneer filed 1203 utility
patent applications and obtained 540 patents."9 It has also
signed numerous licensing agreements with different entities,
ranging from universities and small companies to other large

154.
See supra Tables 3-4.
155.
Telephone and In-Person Interviews with Peter Goss, Herb Jervis, Bob
Giaquinta, Steve Callistein, Ed Sease, and Bruce Morrissey (Apr. & May 2002) (specific
information on file with the Authors).
156.
Id. The "bag-tag" licenses place a number of restrictions on the growers' use of
the seed. Thus, seeds are not the subject of any unconditional sale, allowing seed
companies to assert that the patent law exhaustion doctrine should not be triggered.
157.
Telephone Interviews with Herb Jervis, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel,
DuPont/Pioneer (Apr. & May 2002).
158.
Id.
159.
Id.
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peer organizations, based on its patented technologies. 6 ' In
addition, DuPont/Pioneer has initiated fifteen patent lawsuits in
the period from 1997 to 2001 and, in the same period, has also
been sued for patent infringement eleven times.'61
The so-called "bag-tag" or "seed-wrap" licenses constitute the
only example of PVP licensing that we have found in this study
typically restrict the grower in the use and reuse of the subject
seeds. A representative example of the key licensing restrictions
in a bag-tag license is shown below:
USE RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITED LICENSES FOR
HYBRID SEED: One or more of the parental lines used in
producing this product and this product are proprietary to
ABC, Inc. ("ABC"). Parental lines and this product may be
U.S. Protected Varieties (see tag for additional
information), and may also be protected under the laws of
other countries. Export or transfer of possession may be
prohibited. Purchaser agrees that this purchase is directed
to, and ABC intends to supply, only hybrid seed. Purchaser
agrees that it is not acquiring any rights from ABC to use
any parental line that may be unintentionally contained
herein for purposes other than production of forage, or
grain for feeding or processing. One or more of the parental
lines used in producing this product may constitute a trade
secret. Purchaser agrees that it is granted a limited license
under ABC's trade secret rights to use any parental seed
that might be unintentionally contained herein only for
purposes of producing forage, or grain for feeding or
processing. Purchaser further agrees, that under these
trade secret rights, any parental seed, and the genetic
material contained herein, is confidential and must be
maintained in confidence. If the tag indicates this product
or the parental lines used in producing this product are
protected under one or more U.S. patents, Purchaser agrees
that it is granted a limited license thereunder only to
produce forage, or grain for feeding or processing. Resale of
this seed or supply of saved seed to anyone, including
Purchaser, for planting is strictly prohibited under this
license. Use of this product, or the parental lines used in
producing this product, for use in development or breeding
also is strictly prohibited. All uses outside ,of the United
States are prohibited to the extent they result in
160.
Interviews with Bob Giaquinta,
Director Technology Transfer &
Licensing/Intellectual Property Management, DuPont/Pioneer; Bruce Morrissey,
Corporate Counsel, Dupont/Pioneer; and Herb Jervis, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel,
DuPont/Pioneer (Apr. & May 2002).
161.
Telephone Interviews with Herb Jervis, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel,
DuPont/Pioneer (Apr. & May 2002).
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infringement of U.S. patents. For availability of other
licenses contact ABC.
Note that PVP protection is not necessary to enter into these
bag-tag license agreements. It is possible to establish these
license agreements based on trade secret or utility patent
protection for the plant varieties being traded. Recent court
decisions suggest that key provisions of these agreements will be
upheld against a variety of federal law challenges.'6 2
2. PVP Enforcement Actions. On the enforcement front,
there are few reported decisions involving infringement of PVP
rights in the last thirty years."' Most of the successful
enforcements of PVP rights have been against farmers who have
been guilty of "brown-bagging" seeds of PVP-protected plant
varieties, thereby going beyond the crop exemption in the
PVPA."' It is evident that the PVPA does provide some limited
leverage against farmers or grain elevators that deal in saved
seed derived from a protected variety.
The PVPA may also provide some advantages over trade
secret protection. Whereas trade secret protection can be
circumvented through "reverse engineering" practices, the PVPA
does appear to proscribe some forms of reverse engineering, such
as the practice of "chasing
the selfs" to identify inbred parents of
65
a protected variety.
However, our interviews persuade us that the obstacles to
PVP enforcement are far more significant. As we shall see in the
next section, it is clear that the PVPA does not provide the scope
of protection necessary to prevent appropriation of PVP-protected

162.
E.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Older decisions
from outside the seed industry present similar scenarios. See, e.g., Tripoli Co. v. Wella
Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970) (suggesting that product instructions showing an intent
to prevent a distributor from selling beauty products to non-licensed professionals was
reasonable and not in violation of the Sherman Act given, inter alia, there was no showing
of a significant anticompetitive consequence); Chemagro Corp. v. Universal Chem. Co.,
244 F. Supp. 486, 490 (E.D. Tex. 1965) (concluding that a limited patent license can take
the form of a written label notice attached to a 'product, which can restrict usage of
subsequent purchasers and yield infringement actions if violated).
163.
Especially rare are any definitive appellate level pronouncements on PVP law.
See, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995); Delta & Pine Land Co. v.
Sinkers Corp., 177 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co.,
694 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1983).
164.
See, e.g., Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 179; N. Star Genetics, Ltd. v. Bata, No. CIV. A300-57, 2001 WL 1820380 (D.N.D. Aug. 9, 2001).
165.
For a brief account of the technique of "chasing the selfs" as a potential reverse
engineering activity, see Mark D. Janis, Intellectual Property Issues in Plant Breeding
and Plant Biotechnology (forthcoming 2002) (on file with the Authors).
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varieties by competitors and others players in the value chain
such as delinters or ginners.'66
There are three main reasons for the absence of significant
post-issuance PVP rights-based licensing or enforcement activity
against competitors in the agricultural value chain.167 The PVPA
is easy to circumvent because the scope of protection that is
accorded is limited; even a minimal modification of a PVPprotected variety puts one outside the scope of protection as not
being an "essentially derived variety" (EDV)."' In other words,
the PVPA does not permit replication of protected varieties
(knock-offs), as even minor changes to a protected variety put one
outside the sphere of infringement. Second, the research or
"breeding" exception is broad and permits all breeding activities
by commercial and non-commercial entities based on protected
varieties to be exempted.'6 9 This exemption is related to the EDVs
and protects use of a protected variety to create other varieties,
even if the new variety is genetically predominantly related to
the original protected variety.70 Third, the crop or "saved-seed"
exemption permits farmers to set aside seed for their own
subsequent use, but it does not permit sale of seed for use as feed
or food, or for third-party use as seed.' 7 ' This requires PVP
plaintiffs to establish proof of purpose for specific activities that
may be undertaken by potential infringers, a difficult evidentiary
task.
3. Conclusions About PVP Excludability and Incentives.
We have asserted that our anecdotal studies reveal little or no
evidence that the PVPA provides patent-like incentives and
excludability when we consider indicia traditional legal scholars
ordinarily consider-that is, licensing and enforcement activity.

166.
Sinkers Corp., 177 F.3d at 1351 (concluding that, to hold a delinter liable for the
unauthorized transfer of possession of protected seed, the plaintiff must establish
scienter).
167.
We acknowledge that other factors may also explain the apparent absence of
significant enforcement activity. It is possible that PVP owners have routinely threatened
enforcement actions and settled them without litigation, or without any proceedings that
resulted in reported decisions. Our anecdotal studies reveal no evidence to support this
possibility. It is also possible that the provisions of the PVPA are so crystal clear that
everyone in the industry knows exactly what behavior to avoid, so that no opportunity for
dispute would ever present itself. We are willing to wager that this is not a viable
explanation.
For an explanation of the concept of EDVs as understood at the international
168.
level, see, for example, ASSINSEL, Essential Derivation and Dependence: Practical
Information, at http://www.worldseed.org/derive.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
169.
See 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2000).
170.
Id.
171.
Id. § 2543.
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The agricultural economics literature contains some assessments

of PVPA performance using other economic indicia-including
direct evidence of research and development (R & D) spending in
plant breeding before and after the passage of the PVPA, and
evidence on improvements in crop quality across the same time
frame. These studies tend to buttress our conclusion that the
PVPA does not provide patent-like ex ante incentives.
In the mid-1980s, there were some cautious suggestions that
the PVPA might increase R & D investments in breeding
programs." 2 Although the limited degree of exclusive rights
permitted by the PVPA was a concern because it did not appear
to provide optimal levels of incentives to engage in plant
breeding, there was some hope that the PVPA might have
parallel effects to the utility patent laws." 3
However, more recent studies now confirm misgivings about
the PVPA's capacity to provide adequate ex ante incentives. For
example, in the case of wheat breeding, a study by Alston and
Venner shows that there is no evidence of an increase in private
investment in breeding research activities based on the PVPA.'74
Another commentator, Professor Jack Kloppenburg, Jr.,
acknowledges that private R & D spending in plant breeding has
increased substantially since 1970, but argues that the trend
simply represents the extension of a pre-existing tendency, with
no evidence that the passage of the PVPA has caused this trend,
or even accelerated it meaningfully.'
Alston, Venner, and
Kloppenburg agree that economic and other evidence suggests
the PVPA serves "primarily as a marketing tool with no impact
on excludability or appropriability." 176 While Kloppenburg lays

the blame in large part on the PVPA's omission of any
"superiority" prerequisite, we think that the problem inheres
mainly in the PVPA's limited scope of protection. Accordingly,
while we may disagree with Kloppenburg's rationale and with
some of his broader conclusions about intellectual property rights
for plant biotechnology, we agree with his assessment that the
PVPA does not stimulate R & D spending.
172.

See generally L.J. BUTLER & B.W. MARION, THE IMPACTS OF PATENT

PROTECTION ON THE U.S. SEED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC PLANT BREEDING (1985).
173.
WILLIAM H. LESSER & ROBERT T. MASSON, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION ACT 60, 127 (1983).

174.
Julian M. Alston & Raymond J. Venner, The Effects of the U.S. Plant Variety
Protection Act on Wheat Genetic Improvement, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 62 (Int'l Food
Policy Res. Inst., Washington, D.C.), May 2000, at http://www.grain.org/docs/eptdp62.pdf
(last visited July 19, 2002).
175.
See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 59, at 141-50.
176.
Alston & Venner, supra note 174, at 31; see also KLOPPENBURG, supra note 59,
at 140-41.
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Recent studies also raise questions about whether the PVPA
has enhanced crop quality or crop yields. The Alston and Venner
wheat study shows that the PVPA does not appear to have
contributed to an increase in the commercial or experimental
yields of wheat. 7 7 Alston and Venner also find no evidence of an
increase in the average price, of wheat seed above competitive
levels and, by extension, no evidence of the existence of an
increase in inventor royalties to wheat breeders. 8
Professor Kloppenburg draws similar conclusions regarding
the quality of the soybean crop, citing a soybean study showing
"no statistically significant difference in the rate of yield
improvement" for soybeans before and after the passage of the
PVPA in 1970.179 He argues that the increase in choice, measured
in terms of sheer increased numbers of varieties, may be illusory
if these varieties differ one from another in only a narrow range
of qualities-that is, if they present minute refinements in
genetics of specified elite lines-and the differences represent no
agronomic improvement, but merely facilitate product
differentiation. 180
V.

CONCLUSION

We draw a number of conclusions from these studies. First,
the history of plant variety protection regimes in the United
States and abroad reveals that the role of plant variety
protection in the overall intellectual property scheme has
mutated greatly without any fundamental changes to the general
statutory approach to plant variety protection. Whereas plant
variety protection was initially designed as the primary (or even
exclusive) form of intellectual property protection for seed-grown
plants, the coming of plant biotechnology, and the dawning
acceptance of utility patents for plants, has relegated plant
variety protection to a secondary role. Modest statutory
amendments to the PVPA have shown no real promise of lifting
the PVPA up from this secondary status.
Second, our empirical assessment of licensing and enforcement
activities concerning U.S. plant variety protection certificates
confirms that the PVPA regime as presently constituted plays only
a marginal role in stimulating plant breeding research in the
United States. Our assessment strongly suggests that the PVPA

177.
178.
179.
180.

See Alston & Venner, supra note 174, at 31.
Id.
See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 59, at 141-50.
Id.
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does not provide patent-like ex ante innovation and investment
incentives and that the PVPA has not generated substantial ex post
licensing and enforcement activity. Instead, its role in the United
States appears to be very modest: it may serve as a marketing tool;
it may provide some non-propagation licensing rights akin to
contractual shrink-wrap rights, enforceable against those who deal
in "saved" seeds; and it may provide a superior alternative to trade
secret protection-for example, for seeds whose secret parent lines
might otherwise be revealed through reverse engineering.
Third, the insights from this paper have implications beyond
the area of plant intellectual property rights. For example, we
intend to adapt our analysis to analyze the effectiveness of other sui
generis, technology-specific, legislatively created intellectual
property rights, such as the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act. We
then intend to formulate broader conclusions about the
effectiveness of "small" and porous, technology-specific intellectual
property rights regimes.
PVPA proponents presented the PVPA as a regime that would
meet the lofty objective of providing patent-like protection in a
specific technological area-plant innovation-by seeking to capture
the social benefits of patent protection, but nevertheless,
accomplishing this by striking a different balance between protected
and permitted activities. Our thirty-year PVP experience suggests
that narrow, Swiss-cheese like, intellectual property protection does
not promote excludability and, consequently, does not permit
appropriability.
Taken together, these observations suggest to us that to
encourage plant innovation, reformers should direct their
energies not towards refining the PVPA, but rather towards
better shaping the utility patent regime to accommodate plants
and plant biotechnology innovation. Indeed, the very existence of
the PVPA may pose future political and legal problems by
exerting pressure on the more robust utility patent protection
regime for plants by, for example, creating opportunities for
seeking heightened standards for non-obviousness for plant
utility patents.
There are very limited reasons that support retaining a PVP
regime of protection. The PVP may be favored by small plant
breeders who may wish to protect their varieties without seeking
utility patents, as patents are relatively expensive to obtain and set
a higher threshold requirement for protection. By contrast, the PVP
is easier and cheaper to obtain and does provide some marketing
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benefits. Our international obligations under UPOV mandate that
we continue to retain PVP protection for new plant varieties.'
All the same, it remains to be seen whether large or small
breeders will continue to pursue exclusive PVP protection in light of
the J.E.M. v. Pioneer' decision permitting dual PVP and utility
patent protection for new plant varieties.
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See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing U.S. accession to the

UPOV).
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J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).

